Criminal Law—Power of Parole Board to Suspend Sentence by Buffalo Law Review
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 8 Number 1 Article 54 
10-1-1958 
Criminal Law—Power of Parole Board to Suspend Sentence 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Buffalo Law Review, Criminal Law—Power of Parole Board to Suspend Sentence, 8 Buff. L. Rev. 106 
(1958). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol8/iss1/54 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Power of Parole Board fo Suspend Sentence
A sentence of imprisonment is a solemn pronouncement. As a
safeguard to the prisoner the Legislature has provided in section 2188
or the Penal Law that: "[tlhe court, judge, justice or magistrate author-
ized to impose sentence upon conviction may I * 1 (1) suspend sen-
tence, or may impose sentence and suspend the execution of the judg-
ment. * * * Provided, however, that the imprisonment directed by
the judgment, shall not be suspr nded or interrupted after such im-
prisonment shall have commenced." (Emphasis added.) Simiarly, sec-
tion 470-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure entitled "Sispension
of sentence; suspension of execution of judgment", provides: * * *
Provided, however, that the imprisonment directed by the judgment
shall not be suspended or interrupted after such imprisonment shall
have commenced." [Emphasis added.]' 3
The Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Rainone v. Murphy,14 a 1956 case,
considered the legislative purpose underlying the above statutes in relation to the
power of the Parole Board to suspend sentence. The case concerned a prisoner
who, while serving a state sentence, was surrendered to federal authorities to serve
a federal sentence. The Court held in that case that the Parole Board had no
power to suspend the sentence in light of the statutory rules forbidding the courts
to do so. Although the board is not expressly forbidden to suspend, as are the
courts, the power is nbt to be implied. Discussing the subject, the Court states:
The prisoner by his own act of delinquency amounting to a vio-
lation of parole, may interrupt the running of the sentence. However,
it begins to run again when he. is apprehended and returned to the
custody of the Parole Board. [Emphasis added.) ...Regardless, how-
ever, of what the Parole Board does with the prisoner, after it has re-
gained custody of him his state sentence continues to run ...[Tihe
Parole Board, having the power only to ameliorate punishment under
the sentence by parole, can itself do nothing insofar as the running of
the sentence is concerned. 15
In People ex rel. Kenny v. Jackson,16 decided this term, the prisoner was
sentenced in 1940 to Elmira Reformatory for a maximum of ten years. In 1941,
he was released on parole. In 1942, he was arrested and convicted on a second
felony and sentenced to from five to ten years. He was taken to state prison and
started serving the unfinished time on the first sentence. In 1943, he was paroled
on his first sentence and started serving his second sentence (thus receiving
credit on his first sentence while serving his second). He, at this time signed a
statement to the effect that he understood that violation of proper conduct would
13. People ex rel. Rainone v. Murphy, 1 N.Y.2d 367, 372, 153 N.Y.S.2d 21,
26 (1956).
14. 1 N.Y.2d 367, 153 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1956).
15. Id. at 373, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
16. 4 N.Y.2d 229, 173 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1958).
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result in revocation of parole and of the permission to start the new (second)
sentence at that time. The prisoner was paroled under the second sentence in
1946 while still on parole from the first sentence and in 1947 was arrested and
convicted of a misdemeanor,17 thereby breaking his parole.18 In 1948, he again
started to serve his sentences.
Pursuant to section 218 of the Correction Law, the Parole Board ordered
that the balance of the maximum sentences be served--consecutively, not concur-
rently. When the longer of the two remaining periods had been served, this habeas
corpus action was begun on the theory that the Parole Board had no power once
the sentences had been started concurrently to suspend one until the other had
been served.
But in this case the Court of Appeals held (4-3): "By the provisions of
section 218 of that law [Correction Law] the board was empowered to require
the prisoner 'to serve out in prison the balance of the maximum term for which
he was originally sentenced.' Nothing more than that was done here." The Court
felt that the Rainone case concerned a different question and that the decision did
not bind them to restrict the power of the Parole Board in a case such as this.
However, the dissent felt that the reasoning of the Rainone case compelled
the Court to take a consistent view on the facts of the instant case. The construc-
tion of the statutes leading to the divisions of authority outlined in Rainone and
resulting in the Court's declarations (outlined above), the dissent argued, should
deny any board power to make the remaining sentences consecutive. By making
the sentences consecutive, the board is in effect suspending the running of the
sentence.
The majority seems willing to allow the power of suspension to the board
when the prisoner's own culpable conduct has been the motivating cause as
opposed to voluntary action on the part of the board as in the Rainone case.
Although this may be a reasonable distinction, the result would seem to conflict
with the division of authority and reasoning outlined in Rainone.
Waiver of Jury Trial
Article I, section 2 of the New York State Constitution states in part:
A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases,
except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by death,
17. Incarceration as a misdemeanant suspends the running of sentences.
Spearling v. Moran, 277 App.Div. 778, 97 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d Dep't 1950); see also
note 14, supra.
18. CoRREcrION LAw §218.
